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IFANS Focus The Inauguration of the Kishida Cabinet and Recent Developments in Japanese Politics JO Yanghyeon Upload Date 2021-11-05 Hits 2130
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Ⅰ. The 2021 LDP Leadership Election: Stability over Reform
Ⅱ. Kishida’s Ideological Orientation and Policy Line
Ⅲ. Outlook
Ⅳ. Implications for Korea-Japan Relations


On September 29, 2021, Kishida Fumio won the LDP presidential election. Kishida formed a new cabinet as the 100th prime minister on October 4. Kishida outlined major policies in his first keynote address at a parliamentary session as prime minister on October 8. However, Prime Minister Kishida dissolved lower house on October 14, and the Kishida cabinet became Japan’s shortest-lived cabinet. The October 31 election will be the first general election in almost four years. This article evaluates Kishida’s victory in the election and his major policies and then forecasts future developments in Japanese politics.


Ⅰ. The 2021 LDP Leadership Election: Stability over Reform

Four candidates ran for the 2021 LDP leadership election. Fumio Kishida, former Chairperson of the LDP’s Policy Affairs Research Council, supported by those in favor of stability, and Kono Taro, who garnered a reputation as administrative reform minister, were two front runners. Kishida and Kono had virtually tied in the first round of voting, but Kishida beat out Kono Taro in a second-round runoff vote. Kishida’s victory was driven by strong support among LDP Diet members because the runoff vote gives more weight to Diet members’ votes than party members’ votes. Major factions in the LDP did not agree on a single candidate and allowed Diet members to choose their preferred candidate, and the results of the election show that the LDP chose stability over reform.    

In the 2021 LDP leadership election, Kishida pledged to commit himself to ‘tolerant politics.’ Since the inauguration of Abe’s second cabinet in 2012, Kishida has held key posts in the party and government, including foreign minister, defense minister, and chairperson of the LDP’s Policy Affairs Research Council, galvanizing support with his vision for a stable government with the continuity of policies. Kishida was reluctant to re-investigate the Kake Gakuen Scandal and Moritomo Gakuen scandal known for Abe’s alleged involvement. After Suga Yoshihide defeated Kishida in the 2020 LDP leadership election, Kishida tried to change his image from a man reluctant to express his intention to an outspoken politician. In order to improve weak speaking skills often mentioned as his Achilles’ heel, Kishida drew up a well-thought-out policy vision and seized the upper hand in the leadership election debate. Kishida questioned the term of the LDP’s secretary-general, and it turned out to be a critical winning move, which ended up with Suga’s decision not to run for the election.

In contrast, Kono, underscored that he is a man with initiative and drive to implement new policies while appealing his reform-minded views and popularity. However, some Diet members are wary of Kono’s signature reform-minded policies close to the opposition party’s stance, such as pushing out nuclear energy and a guaranteed minimum portion of the public pension. Kono’s alliance with former Secretary-General of the LDP Shigeru Ishiba, who was critical of former Prime Minister Abe, inadvertently made it difficult for influential Diet members including Abe and Taro Aso to cooperate. As the ‘face of the election’ recognized by LDP Diet members, Kono’s value decreased as the flattened COVID-19 curve alleviated the sense of urgency that the LDP might lose in the general election.


Ⅱ. Kishida’s Ideological Orientation and Policy Line

Kishida is the chairman of the “Kochikai,” a leading faction with a strong liberal disposition in the LDP, and has a different ideological orientation from Koizumi, Abe, and Aso. However, since joining the Abe cabinet, he has made numerous adaptations to his stance on several major issues. Kishida supported the Abe cabinet’s reinterpretation of the constitution on the right of collective self-defense and recently announced that he would revise the constitution and consider developing strike capabilities on enemy bases. Although Kishida opposes Japan’s nuclear armament, he is in favor of restarting nuclear power plants that meet the standards of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Prime Minister Kishida’s policy speech on October 8 was primarily intended to follow the policy line of the Abe and Suga cabinets. Regarding the most urgent issue of formulating COVID-19 countermeasures, he vowed to strengthen the Suga cabinet’s crisis management capabilities, focusing on restructuring the medical system. Kishida detailed his plan by proposing securing beds and medical personnel, strengthening home care measures, expanding vaccination and commercialization of oral antiviral COVID treatments this year, digitizing vaccination records, and providing free PCR tests. He also promised to improve the command system to better deal with the pandemic and reduce human mobility flow, revise the law to secure medical resources, develop vaccines and treatments domestically, and provide subsidies and child care services for the businesses and non-regular workers hit hard by the pandemic.

Moreover, Prime Minister Kishida pointed out that the neoliberal policies implemented since the Koizumi cabinet deepened economic inequality in Japanese society and proposed “the Reiwa version of the income doubling plan” as a “new Japanese capitalism” model seeks to achieve the goal of redistribution. Former Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato initiated the original “Income Doubling Plan,” which laid the foundation for Japan’s rapid economic growth in the 1960s. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Kishida’s “Reiwa version of income doubling plan” focuses on distribution rather than growth. In other words, the plan seeks to boost wage growth, support housing, and education costs, and stimulate income increases in the medical and childcare sectors based on tax measures to help more join the middle class and create a balanced cycle of growth and distribution.

Kishida’s concrete growth strategy includes boosting R&D investments in high tech industries by establishing a 10 trillion yen university fund, promoting local digitalization to narrow the rural-urban digital divide, and overhauling the social security system and tax system tailored to the coming age in which the average life span is 100 years. Kishida also outlined his “clean energy policy” that seeks to link up measures to combat global warming and his growth strategy to achieve the goal of reaching net zero emissions by 2050, maximize the introduction of renewable energy, re-start the existing nuclear power plants that meet safety standards, expand investment in small reactors and nuclear fusion energy, and retain Japan’s nuclear technology and experts. Furthermore, Kishida’s distribution strategy aims to foster symbiotic co-existence of large-scale and small- to mid-sized enterprises, increase wages, formulate measures to expand the middle class and tackle low birth rate, expand childcare, education and housing support, promote wage increase for the health and child care workforce, and establish the social security system embracing all generations.

Prime Minister Kishida said that the biggest goal of his macroeconomic policy is to escape deflation by implementing bold monetary policy, and flexible fiscal policy and growth strategy. This shows that Kishida is trying to differentiate himself from his predecessors based on the Reiwa version of the income doubling plan. However, the Reiwa plan is actually an extension of Abenomics. Kishida tends to distance his cabinet from the Kochikai’s “small government” tradition and to seek the government’s active intervention in monetary policies rather than sound government finances. This appears to be driven by the perception that stimulus spending of tens of trillions of yen is needed to overcome serious socio-economic disparities, deflation, and formulate emergency measures to combat the COVID-19 pandemic. Kishida also views that it is important to ease a strict annuality, which means that a budget must be spent by the end of a fiscal year and cannot be carried over, in order to secure the finances to be spent on mid-to long term state affairs including boosting investments in science and technologies and infrastructure. In line with this, the Kishida cabinet’s position is not to raise the consumptions tax for the next 10 years while putting the goal of achieving the positive primary balance, which means turning the basic fiscal balance into a surplus.

Kishida’s foreign and national security policies inherit the policies implemented by the Abe and Suga cabinets. As three “resolutions” for Japanese diplomacy, Kishida proposed safeguarding universal values including freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, protecting Japan’s peace and security, contributing to the international community, and spearheading international efforts to tackle various global issues.

Moreover, to attain such goals, Kishida suggested: achieving a free and open Indo-Pacific by working together with allies and partners based on the U.S.-Japan alliance; maintaining dialogue with China while formulating flexible responses to stabilize the Taiwan Strait and effectively address the human rights issues in Xinjiang Uyghur and Hong Kong; creating an assistant position to the prime minister in charge of tackling human rights issues; revising Japan’s National Security Strategy, Defense White Paper, and Medium Term Defense Program to bolster capabilities in defending its territorial waters and missile defense capabilities; advancing economic security with the appointment of ministers in charge, securing strategic materials, preventive measures against technology leakage; establishing stable supply chains for state-of-the-art semiconductors; normalizing diplomatic relations with North Korea; considering the summit with Kim Jong Un without pre-conditions; resolving the Northern Territorial Issue with Russia over and signing a peace treaty; realizing a world without nuclear weapons by promoting nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.


Ⅲ. Outlook

The launch of a new cabinet led by Fumio Kishida from the Kochikai could be an opportunity to transform Japanese politics as Kishida is the first prime minister the traditionally dovish Kochikai faction has produced since Miyazawa Kiichi, who held the office from 1991 to 1993. 

Founded in 1955 by a coalition of conservative forces, the LDP consisted of members with different ideologies. On one side, there were liberal forces affiliated with the Kochikai, emphasizing market-oriented management of the economy, adherence to Japan’s post-war pacifist constitution, cooperation with China (the People’s Republic of China). On the other side, there were hawkish forces like the Seiwakai or the Nakasone faction stressing government intervention in the economy, the amendment to the pacifist constitution, and cooperation with anti-communist Asian countries such as Korea and Taiwan. The Keiseikai faction led by Kakuei Tanaka, which had an overwhelming influence within the LDP until the 1980s, positioned itself in the middle of these two forces and had a casting vote in major elections like the LDP leadership election. 

When the Liberal Democratic Party’s one-party dominance ended in the 1990s, centrist and liberal forces within the LDP joined forces and came back to power in an unprecedented coalition with the Japan Socialist Party (JSP). During this period, Japan maintained a balance between the U.S.-Japan alliance and its Asia diplomacy, and made a series of progressive diplomatic achievements such as the Kono Statement, the Murayama Statement, and the creation of the Asian Women’s Fund. But as the Japanese society shifted towards conservatism in the 2000s, liberal forces lost ground, and hawkish politicians came to power. Aside from the Democratic Party of Japan’s less than three and a half years in power, for the past 20 years, the post of prime minister has been dominated by Seiwakai members: Yoshiro Mori, Junichiro Koizumi, Yasuo Fukuda, and Shinzo Abe. 

Viewed in this light, the launch of the Kishida cabinet officially marks the beginning of the post-Abe era. Former Prime Minister Suga, who did not belong to any faction, was widely viewed as an interim leader who filled in the remainder of Abe’s term. And Suga failed to present a national vision comparable to Abe’s signature economic policy “Abenomics” or his political agenda of “breaking away from the postwar regime.” On the contrary, Kishida will be on track for at least a three-year tenure as he belongs to the third-largest faction within the party. Moreover, Prime Minister Kishida is a well-prepared leader with a clear vision, such as the Reiwa version of the income doubling plan. 

Prime Minister Kishida has promised to carefully listen to the voices of the people and take action, suggesting that he would differentiate his cabinet from that of Shinzo Abe. Regarding the relationship between the party and the government, Kishida called attention to the negative consequences of the strong decision-making power of the prime minister’s office and promised to make sure that the government listens to the voices of the party and individual lawmakers on key policy agendas. Kishida also pledged to limit the term of party officials other than the president to a one-year term, and only up to three consecutive terms. Moreover, he selected a cabinet including 13 members without previous ministerial experience. 

Nevertheless, it is undeniable that Kishida rewarded key party and ministerial posts to those who had helped him win and the factions that backed him in the party leadership vote. For instance, former economy minister Akira Amari was appointed the LDP secretary-general. He is one of the so-called 3As, including Abe and Aso, and served as Abe’s economy minister. But the appointment of Amari as secretary-general has drawn public criticism as Amari had previously resigned as economy minister over graft allegations in 2016. Also, Prime Minister Kishida appointed Sanae Takaichi as the LDP policy chief. Backed by Abe, she was successful in the first round of the LDP leadership race but later supported Kishida in the second round. Kishida also picked key posts like the industry minister and the finance minister from the LDP’s two largest factions, the Hosoda faction led by Abe and the Aso faction. 

The Japanese public holds broadly negative views of the outcomes of the leadership election and the launch of the Kishida cabinet. The prevailing view is that the Kishida cabinet, in terms of the appointment of key cabinet posts and policy agendas, is as old-fashioned as its predecessors. Many believe that the new cabinet, just like the one led by Suga, is a mere rehash of Abe’s cabinet. 

According to a poll conducted by the Nikkei shortly after the launch of the Kishida cabinet, the approval rating of the Kishida cabinet was only 59%, far below what the Suga cabinet saw at the time of its launch. This was the third-lowest inaugural rating in history.

The upcoming general election on October 31 will be Kishida’s first major test. Former Prime Minister Abe won six straight elections and has been prime minister for nearly eight consecutive years. It will be his first chance to cement his value and position as the ‘face of the election.’ Shortly after the launch of his cabinet, Prime Minister Kishida announced that he will dissolve the lower chamber of the parliament on October 14th to pave the way for the general election on October 31st. This 100th government cabinet has set a new record for Japan’s “shortest-lived” cabinet. The 17-day interval between the lower house dissolution and the vote indicates that Prime Minister Kishida wants to hold an election before public interest in his cabinet fades. 

Kishida has publicly stated a realistic goal for the coalition of the LDP and Komeito, which was to keep a majority of the seats and retain power. The Olympics, which have put an immense burden on Japan have ended, and the country’s coronavirus situation that had troubled the cabinets led by Suga and Abe is gradually being brought under control. Considering the recent rebound in the approval rating of the LDP and the absence of strong opposition forces, the coalition seems to have an upper hand. Some variables could potentially affect the election results, such as the possibility of a cabinet scandal, a surge in COVID-19 cases, cooperation between opposition parties, and a rise in voter turnout, but it is widely expected that the ruling coalition will secure a majority of seats with ease. 

The LDP’s victory in the general election would give Prime Minister Kishida leverage to carry out a cabinet reshuffle and form a new cabinet that reflects his preferences. If he makes notable achievements in tackling the pandemic, revitalizing the economy, stably managing U.S.-Japan relations as well as China-Japan relations with diplomatic approaches, and winning the July 2022 upper house election, his government will see greater prospects for a stable government. 


Ⅳ. Implications for Korea-Japan Relations

Prime Minister Kishida served as the Japanese foreign minister from 2012 to 2017. During his tenure, Hashima Island was added to the UNESCO World Heritage list and the 2015 ‘comfort women’ agreement was signed. For this reason, many Koreans view him as a hard-liner on historic issues. With regards to the two particularly contentious historical issues, Japan’s wartime mobilization of forced labor and the issue of ‘comfort women,’ Kishida said “South Korea should respect international law and abide by state-to-state agreements,” and urged the South Korean side to “present an acceptable solution at an early date to improve bilateral relations.” His comments suggest that the new cabinet’s position on the history issue will not deviate much from that of its predecessors. And in his first policy speech, Kishida stressed that Japan will “strongly demand an appropriate response from South Korea to return the relationship to a healthy one in line with Japan’s consistent position.” He also added that Korea is Japan’s “important neighbor.” 

Nevertheless, Prime Minister Kishida comes from the Kochikai faction that has a long tradition of emphasizing Japan’s Asia diplomacy. Unlike his predecessors, Shinzo Abe and Taro Aso, Prime Minister Kishida has no record of backing away from the Kono Statement’s apologetic stance or promoting revisionist historical textbooks. Nor has he chosen a hardline option to deal with Korea-Japan relations. During his four-year term as foreign minister, Kishida maintained amicable relations with the U.S. and neighboring countries including China. When dealing with sensitive agendas related to wartime history, such as former U.S. President Barack Obama’s visit to Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum and Abe’s visit to the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor, Kishida as foreign minister refrained from creating unnecessary controversy. In December 2020, Kishida said in an interview that the 2015 agreement holds significance since the two countries agreed to “refrain from criticizing and blaming each other in the international society” under the deal. His remarks suggest that he is well aware of the importance of forging a stable relationship with Seoul. 

There is little chance of the Kishida Cabinet taking bold actions to bring meaningful changes to the relationship between Korea and Japan that has fallen to historic lows, but in the long run, the new cabinet could open up new possibilities for improving bilateral ties. As Korea and Japan are gearing up for major events on their political calendar, including Japan’s general election and upper house election, and South Korea’s presidential election, both sides have little room for immediate political action to improve bilateral relations. Nevertheless, if Prime Minister Kishida forms a stable government after winning the upcoming general election and next year’s upper house election, and if the South Korean government presents a finely-crafted plan to resolve disputes, the two sides might be able to expect some advancement in bilateral relations. Until then, the Korean government should try to recalibrate its diplomatic approach towards Japan while keeping bilateral relations from aggravating further.


* Attached the File #KoreaJapanRelations #KishidaCabinet #LDPElection #JapanesePolitics #JapanElection
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