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IFANS Focus Assessment of the 2021 Japanese General Election and Outlook for Japanese Domestic Politics JO Yanghyeon Upload Date 2021-12-08 Hits 1791
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Ⅰ. Assessment of the October 31 General Election
Ⅱ. Outlook for Japanese Politics
Ⅲ. The Kishida Cabinet’s Policy Line
Ⅳ. Policy Recommendations


Ⅰ. Assessment of the October 31 General Election

The second cabinet of Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida was inaugurated with a coalition between the LDP and Komeito winning the 2021 general election held on October 31, 2021. Prime Minister Kishida achieved his goal of exceeding the parliamentary majority as the LDP-Komeito coalition secured an absolute majority in the parliament by winning 261 seats.

The LDP-Komeito coalition’s victory can be attributable to the opposition party’s disoriented election strategy, growing voter apathy, and Japan’s conservative shift in recent years. With the end of the Tokyo Olympics and the flattened COVID-19 curve in Japan, the LDP’s approval rating rebounded ahead of the election. However, despite many obstacles for the ruling party, such as the prolonged COVID-19 pandemic and worsening economic conditions, the opposition party failed to persuade the Japanese people of the need to hold the ruling party accountable for missteps or differentiate its policies, which resulted in the coalition’s landslide victory. 
    
The Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP), the largest opposition party in Japan, attempted to win additional seats through a coalition with five opposition parties and agreed on a single candidate with the Japanese Communist 

Party and the Democratic Party for the People in more than 70 percent of the single-member constituencies. However, the CDP suffered a significant loss. Both inside and outside, the party strongly criticized the CDP’s coalition with the Communist Party, which has a very different stance on foreign and security policies such as the Self-Defense Forces and the Japan-U.S. alliance. In other words, the Japanese public’s distrust of the opposition party’s ability to steer state affairs deepened due to the unification of candidates. In the 2010s, Japan’s younger generation showed a strong conservative tendency and lowering of the voting age to 18 helped the ruling party gain the upper hand in the election. The lower the voter turnout, the more advantageous the ruling party with substantial organizational and financial resources. Moreover, this year’s election ended with the third-lowest voter turnout (55.93%) since the LDP returned to power in 2012.

 
Ⅱ. Outlook for Japanese Politics

As it is anticipated that the LDP will continue to dominate Japan’s politics in the coming days, whether Prime Minister Kishida can gain control over the LDP and the government will likely be critical in forecasting Japan’s domestic politics. There are numerous risks, such as a possible uptick in COVID-19 cases, political scandals, faltered efforts at revitalizing the economy, and conflicts within the LDP-Komeito coalition government through the upper house election in 2022, the general election in 2023, and the LDP presidential election in 2024. If this weakens Kishida’s grip on power, Kishida will likely share the fate of former Prime Minister Suga, who was replaced just before the Lower House election. However, if the ruling coalition wins the Upper House election scheduled for July next year and wins a majority of seats in the House of Representatives and Upper House, Kishida could fill his Cabinet and implement policies at his discretion.
    
It is forecast that Prime Minister Kishida will seek to connect more with the public to distance his Cabinet from Abe’s contentious legacy and open the post-Abe era. It appears that Kishida’s efforts have focused on departing from Abe’s politics in terms of selecting people for his Cabinet and the formulation and implementation of policies. It is also anticipated that Kishida will seek to differentiate from Abe’s politics by emphasizing "team power," party-government consultations, and accountability and communication with the public rather than relying on personal charisma. About party-government relations, Kishida pointed out the downside of decision-making processes dominated by prime ministers under the Abe and Suga Cabinets, vowing to listen to the party’s opinions and individual lawmakers on major policies. However, he has been cautious about sensitive diplomatic and national security issues such as constitutional amendment and the acquisition of ballistic missile capabilities, structural reform in the economic sector, and issues of political funds. If Kishida’s election pledges do not lead to tangible political reform and party reform measures, he will likely struggle next year in the upper house election. 
    
Komeito, the LDP’s ruling coalition partner, won additional seats in this year’s general election, and the LDP will also need the coalition with Komeito to win the next year’s upper house election. This means that Komeito will likely enjoy greater influence in the coalition government under Kishida. It is worth noting that Komeito, whose main support base is the urban working class, has been criticized for strained relations with the Soka Gakkai International after it formed a coalition with the LDP and the erosion of its long-held identity as one of Japan’s major parties backing the ruling party. Therefore, it is anticipated that Komeito’s stance on constitutional amendment and social welfare issues will be quite different from the LDP’s stance. 
    
As the conservative Japan Innovation Party (JIP) ended up the biggest winner of the election, Japan’s political landscape which has long been characterized by the rivalry between the Liberal Democrats and Democrats is likely to change in the coming years. The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, which saw a significant electoral defeat, is expected to reshuffle party leadership and rethink its left-leaning stance as part of an attempt to woo center-right voters. The Japan Innovation Party swept the Osaka region and its members were elected via a proportional representation ballot in regions including the greater Tokyo area. It has won 41 seats, far exceeding the 21 seat requirement to submit bills for a vote. The JIP has successfully paved the way to becoming a “national party,” and is likely to cooperate with the LDP going forward on issues like constitutional amendment and strengthening defense capabilities. 


Ⅲ. The Kishida Cabinet’s Policy Line

Prime Minister Kishida emphasizes a thorough sense of realism, balance, and cooperation in leading his cabinet forward. He is thus expected to value feasibility and consensus in implementing key policies formulated by his cabinet. With regards to the most urgent issue of addressing Japan’s COVID-19 situation, Prime Minister Kishida said he will strengthen the Suga cabinet’s crisis management capabilities, with a particular focus on revamping the medical system. Kishida told a press conference on the day after the general election he will compile an extra budget by the end of this year that includes cash payouts to so-called non-regular workers, families with children, and those struggling to make ends meet because of the pandemic. 
    
Prime Minister Kishida said he will pivot away from Japan’s neoliberal policy stance dating back to the premiership of Junichiro Koizumi, arguing that neoliberalism has created a widening gap between Japan’s rich and poor. He unveiled a “new Japanese capitalism” model focused on redistribution. The plan seeks to raise wages, support housing, and education costs, and increase the incomes of those providing medical and childcare services based on tax incentives to expand the middle classes. Through this new plan, Kishida hopes to create a virtuous cycle between income redistribution and growth. The primary goal of Kishida’s macroeconomic policy is to escape deflation through bold monetary policy and flexible fiscal policy and growth strategy. But it should be noted that his plans are essentially a continuation of Abenomics. 
    
The Kishida cabinet is expected to inherit foreign and national security policies of the Abe and Suga cabinets. Kishida supported the Abe cabinet’s constitutional reinterpretation to allow the nation to exercise the right of collective self-defense, and vowed to revise the constitution during its tenure and consider developing the Japanese military’s capabilities to attack enemy bases. Kishida is from the liberal Kochikai faction, but while holding key posts like the foreign minister, defense minister, and the chairperson of the LDP’s Policy Affairs Research Council, he had articulated a realistic stance on major foreign policy issues. He opposes nuclear armament but is in favor of restarting nuclear power plants that meet the standards of the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA). 


Ⅳ. Policy Recommendations

The launch of the Kishida cabinet officially marks the beginning of the post-Abe era, but whether his cabinet would develop into a stable regime like those of Shinzo Abe and Junichiro Koizumi depends on the outcomes of the upper house election. Kishida is the first prime minister the Kochikai faction has produced since Miyazawa Kiichi, who held the office from 1991 to 1993. As Kochikai is known for its relatively dovish foreign-policy stance, Kishida might choose to forge stable relations with neighboring countries and avoid unnecessary frictions. Nevertheless, there are many members of the Kishida Cabinet who support revisionist views on history as well as active defense and security policies, so it would be difficult to see an immediate change in Japan’s foreign policy stance. If the LDP and the Kishida cabinet make notable achievements in tackling the pandemic and revitalizing the economy, and if such accomplishments translate into election victory next year, the Kishida government will see greater prospects for a stable government and successfully differentiate itself from the so-called “Abe politics.” 
    
The Kishida Cabinet is likely to carefully explore ways to improve relations with South Korea’s new government while keeping bilateral relations from aggravating further. Kishida urged the South Korean side to “present an acceptable solution at an early date to improve bilateral relations,” suggesting that he inherits his predecessors’ position on matters related to Korea. Having said that, Prime Minister Kishida said it is necessary to improve relations with South Korea to resolve the North Korean issue and promote national security. Moreover, new Japanese foreign minister Yoshimasa Hayashi said outstanding issues between Korea and Japan “cannot be left unresolved.” If the South Korean government presents a finely-crafted plan to resolve disputes, the two sides might expect some advancement in bilateral relations. Therefore, the Korean government should keep the relationship from spiraling further downward until the inauguration of a new South Korean government. 


* Attached the File #KoreaJapanRelations #Japan #GeneralElection #PMKishida
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