Ⅰ. Recent Changes in China’s Position on War in Ukraine
Ⅱ. China’s Dilemma: From the Perspective of International Politics
Ⅲ. China’s Dilemma: From the Perspective of Domestic Politics
Ⅳ. Outlook and Implications
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine enters its 62nd day as of April 26. The war began on February 24, 2022, with the authorization of a “special military operation” against eastern Ukraine by Russian President Vladimir Putin. This months-long war has reportedly led to a series of human rights violations such as war crimes and attacks against civilians, raising serious concerns across the international community. The war unfolding in Ukraine is widely seen as a broader clash between the U.S.-led liberal international order and the Russian authoritarian regime with long-held security grievances about NATO’s eastward expansion. Growing fears about the rise of pro-western nationalists in Ukraine seeking to rally public support may have also played a part. Or maybe the invasion was driven by Putin’s decision to start an all-out war.
But what matters more than tracing the causes of war is finding a way to end it. In a situation where international intervention is required, France, Turkey, Belarus, China, and Israel are often mentioned as mediators, or these countries tend to claim themselves as mediators to help facilitate dialogue and negotiation between Russia and Ukraine. With minimizing the death toll emerging as the most critical issue on the ground, the international community has high hopes for Turkey and China as they have forged close relations with the Kremlin. But the level of commitment demonstrated by the two countries seems to vary. Turkey, for its part, actively arranged the meeting between the foreign ministers of Russia and Ukraine as well as the 5th round of peace talks based on its experience in mediating ethnic disputes in the Balkans. It is viewed that these talks have achieved some outcomes; Russian and Ukrainian negotiators discussed conditions for a ceasefire and the possibility of a summit meeting. China, on the other hand, has sought to keep a diplomatic distance from the war in Ukraine and has not clearly articulated its intention to serve as a mediator.
Ⅰ. Recent Changes in China’s Position on War in Ukraine
Russian invasion threat loomed large over Ukraine in 2021, and China has sought to remain neutral with a principled stance ever since. In mid-January 2022, the U.S., the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and Russia held a series of talks to defuse the Ukraine crisis. Up until this point, China took a neutral stance predicated on its policy of non-interference and just observed the developments on the ground. But from mid-January to just before Russia’s invasion, China shifted its stance and tilted toward Russia, showing off its close ties with the Kremlin. Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian’s statement issued on January 26 and what Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi told U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken during their phone call on the day after were all an indication of China’s Russia-leaning stance, despite Beijing’s efforts to cast itself as a neutral party. China argued that U.S. actions reflect the Cold War mentality and Russia’s security concerns are legitimate.
On the second day of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Wang Yi published China’s official position on the Ukraine crisis titled “China’s Five-Point Position on the Current Ukraine Issue” (“當前烏克蘭問題的五點立場”, hereinafter referred to as “five-point position”). China’s stance on the war in Ukraine has so far been shaped by this official position. [Table 1] A Summary of China’s Five-Point Position (released on February 25, 2022)
In recent months, China has been adjusting the details of its position and intensity of rhetoric according to the development of the situation in Ukraine, while largely sticking to the abovementioned five-point position. At a press briefing on March 7, Wang Yi said Beijing would work with the international community to provide “necessary mediation” between Ukraine and Russia when the time is right and mentioned that China would Ukraine with humanitarian assistance. China has also outlined a six-point initiative (“防止烏克蘭出現大規模人道主義危機的六點倡議,” hereinafter referred to as “six-point initiative”) for preventing a humanitarian crisis in Ukraine. The Initiative calls for the international community to (1) make sure that humanitarian operations abide by the principles of neutrality and impartiality; (2) give full attention to the displaced persons in and from Ukraine; (3) ensure the protection of civilians; (4) provide for safe and smooth humanitarian aid activities; (5) provide for the safety of foreign nationals in Ukraine; and (6) support the United Nations’ coordinating role in channeling humanitarian aid, as well as the work of the U.N. crisis coordinator for Ukraine. Although China used languages like “if necessary” and “humanitarian,” its latest stance is a big step forward compared to its previous position that even rejected calling Russia’s moves on Ukraine an “invasion.”
To summarize, China has basically supported Ukraine’s defense of its sovereignty and territorial integrity, except for a short period when it leaned toward Russia from mid-January to just days before the Russian invasion. Since March, the country has refrained from making direct comments on the security concerns of Russia that the Kremlin calls legitimate. While it remains questionable whether China’s latest stance represents strict neutrality, Beijing is avoiding openly supporting Russia, given the deep current of public opinion around the world critical of Russia’s behavior and the need to preserve its international image. In addition, China has made repeated comments on the issue of humanitarian aid to Ukraine as well as Beijing’s potential role as a mediator.
Ⅱ. China’s Dilemma: From the Perspective of International Politics
China’s position on the Russian invasion of Ukraine has been largely shaped by three factors: China-Russia relations; China-Ukraine relations; and U.S.-China relations.
Among these factors, China’s relationship with Russia has had the most profound effects on the shaping of its stance. Since President Xi Jinping and President Vladimir Putin rose to power, China and Russia have maintained a close relationship, reaching a so-called “honeymoon” phase of their relations. The two countries have formed a coalition that somewhat resembles a united front against the U.S., and backed each other whenever one side gets embroiled in a dispute with the U.S. or other nations in the liberal world. When China faced a diplomatic boycott of the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing over concerns about its human rights violations, Russia was the first country to express strong support for China, and Vladimir Putin was the only head of a major state to attend the opening ceremony of the 2022 Winter Olympics. Considering how China and Russia have developed their relations over the past several years, China is hardly likely to express opposition to Russia’s actions. Russia saw the enlargement of NATO as a threat to its security and cited it as a reason for its invasion of Ukraine. Therefore, China’s insistence on respecting “the legitimate security concerns of all countries,” as Wang Yi told Antony Blinken, could be an indication of Beijing’s support for Moscow. And it shows how China, just like Russia, is becoming increasingly wary of America’s Indo-Pacific strategy and other actions Washington is taking to contain regional rivals. China abstained from voting on a UN resolution condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine (March 2) and a resolution on the humanitarian situation in Ukraine (March 24), in a move to express its opposition. On April 7, China voted against a resolution to suspend Russia from the Human Rights Council, an indication of its support for Russia’s position.
Another factor worth noting is China’s relationship with Ukraine. China has put considerable effort into Central Asia in implementing its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) since 2014, shortly after President Xi Jinping ascended to power. And Ukraine is an important hub within the BRI. International observers view the BRI as President Xi’s signature brand strategy because China under Xi has funneled massive investment into the initiative. Therefore, making tangible progress in the BRI with stable efforts in the run-up to the CCP’s 20th National Congress, which will likely re-elect Xi for his third term, appears to be on top of Beijing’s priority list. In 2021, China and Ukraine signed an agreement to strengthen cooperation in areas including infrastructure projects & highways, bridges, and railways in Ukraine. Moreover, with China and Ukraine signing a contract building a wind farm in Ukraine, Xinjiang Goldwind Science & Technology Co., Ltd., a Chinese energy company, accounts for 20 percent of Ukraine’s energy market. The two countries have maintained friendly relations in areas other than the BRI. As of 2020, trade volume between China and Ukraine exceeded $15.4 billion (USD) and was on an upward trajectory.
When the international community raised questions over the efficacy of China’s Sinovac, Ukraine was one of the forerunners in importing and administering Sinovac. Above all else, China did not recognize Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea. Considering the two countries’ relations over the past three decades, it would be extremely complicated for the two sides to restore their relations if Beijing takes the Kremlin’s side in the Russia-Ukraine war, setting a negative precedent for Central Asian countries. And China’s refusal to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will likely be an obstacle to the effective implementation of the BRI and to galvanizing neighbors’ support for creating regional security frameworks such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
It appears that China had portrayed itself as a neutral party until mid January this year, taking its relations with Ukraine into consideration. However, it is assumed that Beijing ended up making contradictory statements on its stance with the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine because China is in a delicate position where it cannot be seen to support Russia’s invasion in consideration of its relations with the U.S. and European countries. Considering China’s status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, it would be difficult for Beijing to support the Kremlin overtly in the face of international condemnation of Russian aggression in Ukraine. In addition, if China officially supports Russia, this would inevitably sour its relationship with the West. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s mention on February 22 that the spirit and principles of the UN Charter should be upheld appears to come out with Beijing’s consideration of the dynamics underlying international relations and China’s status in the international arena. Beijing has been paying keen attention to the U.S. and Europe’s efforts to deepen their cooperation, reaching out to European capitals. This is because of the possibility that Washington could apply an equivalent level of economic sanctions imposed against the Kremlin to Beijing with numerous speculations thrown around cross-strait relations with the beginning of a Russian invasion. For instance, some observers point to the possibility that Washington could join hands with its European allies and partners to impose export controls against China.
Ⅲ. China’s Dilemma: From the Perspective of Domestic Politics
It also deserves attention that there are significant domestic political factors affecting Beijing’s calculations in formulating responses to the Ukraine conflict apart from China’s foreign relations. The most sensitive point getting Beijing’s nerves regarding China’s territory and sovereignty issue seems to be cross-strait relations. In case China supports Russia out of security concerns, Beijing could follow the same line of logic that Taiwan attempts to undermine its “One China” principle posing serious security threats. Beijing could model on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in pushing ahead with military provocations against Taiwan or unification by force.
However, from Ukraine’s standpoint, pro-Russian forces in Donbas, which provided a justification for Russia’s invasion, would be seen as Russian-backed separatists within its border. If Beijing seeks to remain logically consistent in supporting the Kremlin’s logic, it would have to do the same even in the face of the so-called separatist movements in Xinjiang Uyghur, Tibet, and Hong Kong.
It appears that China’s paradoxical situation is correlated with its domestic politics. However, the border issue generally implies the possible eruption of border disputes with its neighbors. Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, who visited the U.S. on March 31, said, “The Donbas region’s independence goes against the principles of territorial integrity, sovereignty and non-interference that China values very much...If the region could be independent, what would happen to Taiwan or other regions where minorities reside?” This shows that China’s neighboring countries are carefully eyeing on Beijing’s position. The current situation could be a burden for China’s National Congress.
Taken together, the various factors mentioned above seem to have put Beijing in a delicate position where it cannot either support or condemn Russia’s desicion to unleash the war in Ukraine. Meanwhile, numerous observers view that China’s recent comment that it will play a responsible role in the Russia-Ukraine war as Beijing’s intention to mediate. Even in China, discussions on China’s role in mediating Kyiv and the Kremlin are gaining momentum that China should play a role in the Ukraine crisis to improve its international status. In order for such hypothesis to hold true, Russia would have to expect China’s intervention because it can find a plausible excuse to end the war without losing its face. In contrast, some experts cast a skeptical eye on the effectiveness of China’s intervention because the Kremlin is unlikely to concede to Beijing’s mediation plan.
Ⅳ. Outlook and Implications
According to Randall L. Schweller, a state must possess capability and willingness to establish and implement the diplomatic position considered desirable or at least acceptable by the international community. The ability means that the state is capable of maintain autonomy in its conduct of statecraft. Of the countries mentioned as a possible mediator between Ukraine and Russia, China would be the most suitable country for these conditions if Beijing is willing to intervene to mitigate the situation.
The goal of the fifth round of peace talks between Russia and Ukraine mediated by Turkey is an immediate ceasefire. Although the details of the ceasefire negotiation have not been disclosed, it is assumed based on the results of the previous talks that the two sides discussed: (1)Ukraine’s declaration of neutrality and denuclearization; (2)Kyiv’s renouncing its ambitions to join NATO; (3)recapturing Crimea and hosting foreign military bases; (4)the issue of recognizing the Donbas as an independent state. These are primarily concerned with territorial issues. Except for the mention of the humanitarian corridor, it is alleged that the issue of ceasefire or full-fledged humanitarian relief had not been discussed until the fourth round of negotiations.
China expressed its intention to engage in both arbitration and humanitarian aid through two official statements, but it is still unclear whether it will take the role of a mediator to help initiate and promote dialogue between Russia and the U.S. First of all, humanitarian relief has not topped the agenda list so far, so if China clarifies that it will not be involved in the issue of territorial sovereignty, its role in the process will likely be limited. In addition, if Beijing defines the Ukraine situation as the clash of mutual hostility between Kyiv and the Kremlin not as one-sided violence committed by Russia, its options will grow shorter. However, as the situation may cause the liberal bloc to unite against the Ukraine war and affect the interpretation of cross-strait relations, it is assumed that Beijing claims neutrality ostensibly while communicating with the Kremlin within a range that will not put itself under sanctions. It is also assumed that Beijing is sorting out from a long-term perspective which countries are tepid about joining sanctions against Russia, or are not easily swayed by the Western-led discourse.
There is a tendency in international relations to view that national self-determination and preservation of territorial integrity are prone to collide, and thus rarely coexist structurally. It is quite difficult to resolve ethnic conflicts as negotiations tend to be prolonged. In the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict around the Soviet Union’s collapse, peace negotiations, which began in 1992, the year after the incident, seemed to end with the signing of the Bishkek Protocol of 1994. However, the talks have since stalled and the conflict remains unresolved. As the root causes of ethnic conflicts are historically accumulated distrust and mutual antagonism, it is challenging to resolve a crisis if the parties involved do not accept that they have reached a point where they cannot resolve the crisis without international mediation. However, as in the case of the U.S. efforts at mediating peace talks in the Middle East, there is a possibility that the attitude and commitment of a mediator could help mitigate the situation. In line with this, it is worth paying attention that China’s motivation to raise its international status and implement policies could contribute to forging the consensus on ending the Ukraine-Russia war.
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