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IFANS Focus The War in Ukraine and Japan’s Foreign Policy YOON Sukjung Upload Date 2023-04-20 Hits 2161
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Ⅰ. Introduction
Ⅱ. Japan’s View of the Russo-Ukrainian War 
Ⅲ. The Current Status of Japan’s Assistance to Ukraine and Sanctions against Russia
Ⅳ. Implications and Policy Considerations


Ⅰ. Introduction

The Ukrainian war, which began on February 24, 2022, with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s declaration of a “special military operation” in Donbas has entered its second year and upended the European security landscape. This article aims to provide an overview of Japan’s perspective on the ongoing war in Ukraine and how the war has affected its foreign policy. While the war in Ukraine is a European war in a geographical sense, Japan perceives it as a serious security crisis. The Diplomatic bluebook 2022, published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, states that “depending on how the invasion of Ukraine develops, Japan and the world could face the greatest crisis since the end of World War II.” Japan’s view of the global political landscape that has been shaped over the past year as the country watched the unfolding situation in Ukraine is driving the change in Japanese foreign policy. Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, who made a surprise trip to Ukraine on March 21, 2022, announced his plan to make the issues surrounding Ukraine a major agenda item at the G7 Hiroshima summit scheduled to be held in May 2023, which is a clear indication that the situation in Ukraine will continue to affect and shape Japan’s in the coming months and years. For the Yoon Suk Yeol government, which sees Japan as a partner sharing common values, understanding the impact of the Russo-Ukrainian war on Japan’s foreign policy choices and direction would be essential in figuring out ways to strengthen strategic cooperation with Japan. 


Ⅱ. Japan’s View of the Russo-Ukrainian War 

The Japanese government describes Russia’s invasion as “an outrageous act that undermines the foundation of international order such as the prohibition of the use of force, the rule of law, and the respect for human rights.” Prime Minister Kishida has regularly observed that if Russia’s attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force go unchallenged, it will happen elsewhere in the world, including the Indo-Pacific. 
    Japan fears that China may try something similar to what Russia is doing in Ukraine. As he took part in the NATO summit meeting in June 2022, Kishida said “The situation around Japan is becoming increasingly severe with attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force in the East and South China Sea,” and added that “Ukraine may be the East Asia of tomorrow.” From Japan’s perspective, a failure to deter Russian aggression and expansionist ambition in Europe would embolden China, driving Beijing to take an even more aggressive stance on matters in the Indo-Pacific. In other words, the Russian invasion of Ukraine could create a copycat effect, encouraging China to emulate Russia in Taiwan case. Japan is closely watching how the situation on the Ukrainian battlefield is shaping China’s calculus on Taiwan. Russia’s incompetent performance on the battlefield in Ukraine and a barrage of sanctions hitting Russia may have given pause to the Chinese leadership about the idea of unifying with Taiwan by force. Also, with the Taiwan Relations Act, the U.S. would intervene more directly in the event of a Chinese invasion than it has in Ukraine, which would in turn make China more cautious about attacking Taiwan. But if Ukraine’s Western backers grow tired of the war and sanctions on Russia begin to lose steam, this might send a wrong message to China that Western support for Taiwan will drop off over the long term. And Putin’s repeated nuclear saber-rattling could further encourage China to develop its nuclear arsenal. Seen in this light, there is more to Japan’s tough rhetoric and its latest package of sanctions against Russia than mere displeasure with Moscow’s actions; the tough responses are also designed as a warning to China to discourage it from invading Taiwan. 
    For Japan, the war in Ukraine raises an alarm bell about the aggressive intention of authoritarian states. On December 16, 2022, the Japanese government released a new national security strategy, which notes that “Guided by their own historical views and values, some nations, not sharing universal values, are making attempts to revise the existing international order.” In its new national defense strategy released on the same day, Japan stressed that “a country with strong military capability possesses the intention to launch an aggression,” and “when a state’s decision-making process is opaque, there always exists conditions under which threat may materialize.” All these statements suggest that Japan has drawn profound policy implications from the developments in Ukraine. The war has prompted Japan to reinforce its defense capabilities, and the country is now serious about deterring a Chinese attempt to forcibly change the status quo. On top of that, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has prompted Japan to review the ‘Russia factor’ in its foreign policy. In the latest national security strategy, Japan notes that Russia’s activities are “perceived as the most significant and direct threat to security in the European region” and that “Russia’s external and military activities and others in the Indo-Pacific region, together with its strategic coordination with China, are of strong security concern.” China and Russia carried out their first joint aerial strategic patrol in July 2019, and the two sides conducted the fifth round of patrol in November 2022. These patrols are causing grave concerns in Japan as they are becoming a regular feature. These latest developments, combined with the escalation of threats from North Korea, have left Japan with the daunting task of dealing with three aggressive authoritarian states at the same time. Moreover, Japan observes that the turmoil caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine could intensify the attempts to alter the status quo across Europe and the Indo-Pacific.
    With this analysis of the recent developments, Japan has bolstered efforts to enhance diplomatic and security cooperation with European countries. And the Russo-Ukrainian War triggered European capitals to vigorously deepen engagement in various security issues in the Indo-Pacific region to consolidate partnerships with democracies in the region. Taken together, Japan’s perception of the unfolding situation is resonating with NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept, forming a cooperation system between Japan and European countries. In the Joint Statement by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Prime Minister Kishida, issued on January 31, 2023, after their summit, the two sides shared the view that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine gravely altered the security environment in the Euro-Atlantic and beyond, and that unilateral change of the status quo by force or coercion is not acceptable anywhere in the world. And in line with this, Japan is strengthening security cooperation with individual European countries.


Ⅲ. The Current Status of Japan’s Assistance to Ukraine and Sanctions against Russia

Japan has shown diplomatic support for Ukraine and bolstered efforts at providing humanitarian and economic assistance. And its plan to extend the emergency aid program to support Ukraine in winter appears to be aimed at frustrating Russia’s attempts to weaponize winter in Ukraine. Moreover, Japan is providing the Self-Defense Forces’ military equipment and supplies for Ukraine, sending bulletproof vests by revising the “Three Principles on the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology.” Japan could even send lethal weapons that could kill the civilian population to Ukraine at some point. Japan’s National Security Strategy (NSS) defines the “transfer of defense equipment and technology overseas as a key policy instrument to deter unilateral changes to the status quo by force and to provide assistance to countries that are subject to aggression in violation of international law.” And once the U.S., the UK, and Germany decided to send battle tanks to Ukraine early this year, the views that Japan should join them to supply lethal weapons are gaining ground within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).
    Japan aims to increase its diplomatic presence as the chair of G7 by providing assistance to Ukraine. On March 21, 2023, Japanese Primes Minister Fumio Kishida visited Ukraine, and Kishida seems to have assumed that the war in Ukraine would be a major agenda item at the G7 Hiroshima Summit scheduled in May.
    Japan is actively cooperating with the U.S. in imposing strict sanctions against Russia. The U.S. aims to deplete Russia’s purported weapons stockpile and its war-fighting capabilities by imposing prolonged economic and financial downturns as well as technological isolation. Japan has joined the U.S.-led sanctions against Russia for the same purpose. As Japan is scaling up sanctions against Russia, efforts to sign a peace treaty between Japan and Russia were suspended. This implies that Tokyo chose to strengthen cooperation with the U.S. and G7 at the expense of its relations with Russia. Meanwhile, despite the conflict between Japan and Russia triggered by Japan’s sanctions, Japanese companies maintain their rights and interests in the Russian Far East resource development projects Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2. This could be seen as Japan’s diplomatic achievement but simultaneously reveals weaknesses in its relations with Russia. To elaborate, although Japan actively participated in the U.S.-led sanctions against Russia, it also sought to maintain the status quo of the Sakhalin project, meaning that Japan has no choice but to depend on Russia for some of the vital energy sources. Therefore, there is a possibility that Russia will attempt to weaponize its resources by threatening to exclude Japan from the Sakhalin projects to leverage against Japan in the future. 


Ⅳ. Implications and Policy Considerations

It is forecast that Japan’s strategic perception based on the new Cold War logic, which assumes that international relations will likely be realigned and reshaped by the rivalry between democracies and autocracies in the coming years, will contour its foreign policy. Until now, Japan has focused efforts on outcompeting China in the Indo-Pacific. However, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has broadened the geographical scope of Japan’s foreign policy and its strategic perception, urging Tokyo to factor the strategic partnership between China and Russia and Europe’s security into the country’s foreign policy. It is also likely that Japan will take on the role of connecting and orchestrating efforts to promote security in the Indo-Pacific and Europe. 
    Japan’s threat perception in the wake of the Russo-Ukrainian War has led to a re-evaluation of Korea’s importance in formulating and implementing its national security strategies. Accordingly, it is advised that the scope and strategic horizon of the ROK-Japan Strategic Dialogue should be expanded. The dialogue needs to proceed with comprehensive considerations of the direction of Korean diplomacy. The content and level of strategic dialogue with Japan also need to be fine-tuned in order not to accelerate the consolidation of the  new Cold War structure. As the Russo-Ukrainian War has shaken the foundation of the security environment and order in Europe, it is forecast that Korea’s role and contribution to the war will lay the cornerstone of its relations with Europe in the years ahead. To this end, the Korean government needs to scale up its economic and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine. However, it is also recommended that the Korean government be prudent in deciding whether to provide lethal weapons for Ukraine. If the Korean government’s assistance to Ukraine is confined to the economic and humanitarian domains in consideration of its relations with Russia, it should also be noted that the support system is designed and operated in a way that links the fundamental objectives and appropriate means. The tasks ahead for the Korean government will center on how to design strategic approaches to providing economic and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine.

*Attached the File #Europe #China #IndoPacific #Japan #UkrainianWar
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