본문 바로가기
IFANS FOCUS Prospects for North Korea-U.S. Relations after the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election 민정훈 미주연구부 부교수 발행일 2020-10-05 조회수 1062
페이스북 트위터 카카오톡

이메일 보내기

* 모든 항목은 필수 입력 사항입니다.

* 받는 사람 이메일
* 컨텐츠 주소
* 제목
* 메시지
Ⅰ. North Korea-U.S. Relations in 2020
Ⅱ. North Korea-U.S. Relations after the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election 
Ⅲ. Policy Considerations


Since North Korea and the United States walked out of the Hanoi Summit without any deal last year, denuclearization talks between Washington and Pyongyang have remained stalled. President Trump’s top-down style of diplomacy characterized by summit meetings with Chairman Kim Jong-un seemed to steer the denuclearization talks before the Hanoi Summit. President Trump is now focused on managing North Korean issues not to make a negative impact on his reelection campaign. Meanwhile, Pyongyang is stressing self-reliance and self-prosperity, closely monitoring how the U.S. presidential campaign is under way, and preparing for the resumption of the talks with Washington after the U.S. presidential election. This paper examines how North Korea-U.S. relations will proceed after the U.S. presidential election and what needs to be considered to resume the denuclearization talks between Washington and Pyongyang. 


Ⅰ. North Korea-U.S. Relations in 2020

It is not likely that North Korea-U.S. talks would make progress throughout this year mainly because both sides do not want to be more flexible in their stances on the issues of North Korea’s denuclearization before we know the winner of the 2020 U.S. presidential election. President Trump has repeatedly underscored that he has been in a good relationship with Chairman Kim and North Korea has not crossed the red line which means that North Korea conducts a provoking nuclear and long range missile test, in an attempt to manage the North Korean issues not to adversely affect his reelection bid. Many experts in Washington also maintain their negative views on North Korea’s commitment to  denuclearizing itself, and thus, it is not likely that President Trump will provide Pyongyang with a flexible alternative on North Korea’s denuclearization process. This is because such decision could be criticized for prioritizing his political considerations over the strategic interests of the U.S. in negotiating with North Korea. Last but not least, with the U.S. presidential election less than a month away, President Trump was tested positive for COVID-19, which further reduces the possibility of any progress in North Korea-U.S. negotiations before November 3. President Trump’s COVID-19 diagnosis stopped his campaign scheduled to catch up with Biden’s lead. For the rest of the campaign period, President Trump is expected to devote all of his time and energy to recovering from the COVID-19 as soon as possible and restarting his campaign schedules. This suggests that President Trump does not have enough time to get more involved in the North Korean issues before the election day. 

Meanwhile, with the U.S. presidential election just around the corner, Pyongyang is not actively seeking to make progress in the denuclearization talks with Washington. Since North Korea walked away from the  working-level talks in Sweden last October, it has made it public that it would not discuss the issues of  denuclearization until the U.S. drops its hostile policy toward the North. Therefore, it is not likely that Pyongyang will respond to Washington’s proposal to  resume the denuclearization talks without Washington’s agreement to provide its corresponding measures for the denuclearization measures that North Korea already took. Pyongyang could also question if it is beneficial to resume the talks with the Trump administration in the situation where it is unclear whether or not President Trump could get reelected next month. Accordingly, it is more likely that Pyongyang will continue to closely monitor the presidential campaign and make strategic moves to enhance its  bargaining power in preparation for the resumption of the talks with the next U.S. administration. Moreover, North Korea is devoting its time and energy to successfully host the 75th anniversary of the foundation of the Workers’Party of North Korea and overcome all the hardships from international sanctions, the COVID-19 pandemic, and flood. This suggests that Pyongyang does not have much capacity to resume the talks with Washington at the moment. Therefore, Pyongyang is likely to continue to stress  self-reliance and self-prosperity domestically and push ahead with its strategic calculations for the resumption of the talks with the next U.S. administration. 


Ⅱ. North Korea-U.S. Relations after the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election 

It is expected that Washington’s engagement policy with North Korea will be maintained after the 2020 U.S. presidential election. President Trump has been in the talks with North Korea, and Joe Biden on the Democratic side showed his intention to resolve the North Korean issues through dialogue. It is anticipated, however, that who will be the winner of the presidential election next month will affect the pace and structure of the denuclearization talks between Washington and Pyongyang.

If President Trump gets reelected, it is likely that he will resume the denuclearization talks with North Korea with the top-down approach. It is also probable to expect that President Trump will be more willing to make progress in the talks for his diplomatic achievements. In addition, as Stephen Biegun’s  negotiating team has been in place for the talks with Pyongyang, it will take no additional time to organize a new team after the presidential election. 

Taken together, it is expected that North Korea-U.S. talks could resume early next year if President Trump gets reelected. In the meantime, Pyongyang, which has been paying keen attention to which candidate would win the 2020 U.S. presidential election, is likely to congratulate President Trump on his reelection, and welcome the resumption of the talks with Washington. President Trump has stressed that it is important for Pyongyang not to cross the red line in steering the denuclearization talks. Therefore, it is not likely that North Korea will make a provocation to prove its improved intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities to enhance its bargaining power ahead of the resumption of the talks.

Washington is expected to continuously seek to resolve the North Korean issues through diplomatic ways in case Biden takes office as Biden also agrees to resolve the North Korean problems through dialogue. However, it is anticipated that Biden will take a different approach to the denuclearization talks with Pyongyang. Biden has criticized President Trump for failing to make substantial progress through his “summit diplomacy”with Chairman Kim, and instead legitimizing the Kim regime. Biden also made it clear that he would not rely solely on personal ties with Chairman Kim to resolve the North Korean issues. Moreover, considering that Biden exchanged heated rhetoric with Pyongyang such as “gangster,”“tyrant,”“rabid dog,”and “old lunatic,”it will take some time for the two leaders to build trust after Biden takes office. Biden mentioned during his presidential campaign trail that he would maintain and even tighten sanctions on North Korea until the North abandons its nuclear and missile programs while the Biden administration would strengthen its ties with Seoul and Tokyo and urge China to put pressure on the North.

Accordingly, it is anticipated that the Biden administration’s North Korea policy will proceed through  working-level negotiations. And if there is substantial progress in the working-level talks, the two sides will likely discuss the possibility of holding a summit meeting. Considering that the Trump administration has maintained channels to communicate directly with North Korea, it is expected that Washington will prefer bilateral negotiations with Pyongyang closely consulting with Seoul and Tokyo over multilateral talks such as the six-party talks in the 2000s. In addition, it generally takes approximately six months for a new U.S. administration to form its cabinet. Therefore, it is likely that Washington will not be poised to resume the denuclearization talks with Pyongyang until next summer. Pyongyang would also want to take some time to figure out the characteristics and stances of the Biden administration’s negotiation team. Moreover, regardless of which candidate will be the winner of the presidential election, it is very likely that the next U.S. administration has no choice but to pay much of its attention to addressing domestic issues, such as fiscal deficits and economic recovery, caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Washington also wants Pyongyang to take additional denuclearization measures to prove its commitment to denuclearizing itself to resume the stalled denuclearization talks. These situations suggest that the issues of North Korea are not likely to draw much attention of the Biden administration in its early days in office. Therefore, there is a possibility that North Korea will make a provocation to show off its improved ICBM capabilities to attract the Biden administration’s attention and enhance its bargaining power. Pyongyang could perceive that it does not have to observe the red line that President Trump stressed anymore because he is gone, and that demonstrating its improved ICBM capabilities could be a strategically useful way to enhance its bargaining power with the new U.S. administration. If Pyongyang proves that its improved ICBM capabilities can pose a direct threat to the U.S. mainland, it would not be easy for the Biden administration to close the window of the talks with North Korea and return to the “strategic patience.”

Accordingly, Pyongyang is likely to closely monitor  the Biden administration’stances on North Korea and carefully consider whether or not to test-fire ICBMs.   


Ⅲ. Policy Considerations

It is likely that Washington would resume bilateral negotiations with Pyongyang after the 2020 U.S. presidential election in consultation with Seoul and Tokyo. As examined above, if President Trump is reelected, it is likely that Washington will adhere to the top-down approach. Meanwhile, if Biden takes office, the focus will be on bilateral working-level negotiations.

Ahead of the resumption of North Korea-U.S. negotiations, it is necessary to discuss how to set the starting point of the talks. After the two summit meetings, both Washington and Pyongyang came to be fully aware of what the other side wants with regard to North Korea’s denuclearization. Many Washington experts mention that the Trump administration’s maximum pressure policy has not met expectations. They argue that Washington needs a more realistic approach to the North Korean nuclear problems as Pyongyang has advanced its nuclear capabilities despite tough economic sanctions, and the possibility that North Korea will give up its nuclear weapons is very low. Additionally, many point out that the next U.S. administration should not abandon what the Trump administration has achieved in the talks with Pyongyang, such as communication channels with Pyongyang and discussions about North Korea’s denuclearization process. 

It is necessary to come up with a more flexible denuclearization road map that reflects North Korea’s current nuclear capabilities and both Pyongyang and Washington’s strategic and political considerations. First of all, it is necessary to set an end state of North Korea’s denuclearization that both sides could accept.  It is essential to make sure that North Korea’s complete denuclearization is the goal of the denuclearization talks in order to manage the entire negotiation process stably. If it is not clearly set, future negotiations could face difficulties arising from changes in strategic or political environments. Therefore, it is necessary that a more flexible and sustainable end state of North Korea’s denuclearization is proposed, and that both sides accept it as the ultimate goal of future negotiations. If “complete dismantlement of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and middle and long range ballistic missiles and ICBMs”is proposed as an end state of North Korea’s denuclearization, it is more likely for both sides to accept it. 

It is also necessary to provide North Korea with motivations for bringing it back to the negotiating table. To this end, Washington needs to provide Pyongyang with a road map for corresponding measures showing how it could ease and lift economic sanctions imposed to the North and guarantee North Korean regime security in accordance with Pyongyang’s denuclearization measures. North Korea took such measures as  suspending nuclear and missile tests, shutting down Punggyeri nuclear test site, and handing over the remains of American soldiers killed in the Korean War. Pyongyang has argued that it is Washington’s turn to take corresponding measures. Considering North Korea’s strategic and political stances, Washington’s road map for the  corresponding measures is anticipated to provide Pyongyang with a useful justification for returning to the negotiating table, and increase its chances of accepting deals in the denuclearization process.

Last but not least, it seems appropriate for North Korea’s denuclearization process to proceed with two steps,  “nuclear freeze”and “nuclear dismantlement,”based on what has been discussed between Biegun’s team and the North Korean delegation. Specifically, to restart the denuclearization process, Pyongyang needs to freeze its nuclear capabilities - suspending nuclear and missile tests and nuclear materials production,  and shutting down facilities to produce fissile materials. Washington then needs to provide Pyongyang with corresponding measures, such as  a partial lifting of economic sanctions, the end-of-war declaration, and establishment of liaison offices. Both sides’sincere commitment to taking such initial measures would not only contribute to enhancing mutual trust but also function as a momentum to make further progress in the negotiations. Then the two sides will be able to move on to the second step of the denuclearization process. What involved parties learned from negotiating process for the September 19 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks and the following implementation measures is expected to contribute to reducing political costs and reaching an agreement. #Trump #NorthKorea #US #USElection
다운로드
The Full Text.pdf
이전글
2020 미국 대선 이후 북미 관계 전망
다음글
2020 미국 대선 이후 북미 관계 전망
이전
메뉴 담당자 정보 안내
메뉴담당자연구행정과 전화02-3497-7760