본문 바로가기
IFANS FOCUS Recent Changes in North Korea’s Framework for Nuclear Talks   황일도 안보통일연구부 조교수 발행일 2021-12-28 조회수 2437
페이스북 트위터 카카오톡

이메일 보내기

* 모든 항목은 필수 입력 사항입니다.

* 받는 사람 이메일
* 컨텐츠 주소
* 제목
* 메시지
I. Introduction 
II. Background: Diversification of Nuclear Capabilities
III. Analysis: Prospect for Detailed Framework for Nuclear Arms Control Talks
IV. Policy Recommendations


I. Introduction 

North Korea’s plan to develop tactical nuclear weapons and advance preemptive strike doctrines set out at the Eighth Party Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) in January 2021 indicates Pyongyang’s intention to unleash its nuclear war-fighting capabilities on the Korean peninsula. In line with this, the overall focus of North Korean foreign policy in recent years has been on stably or promptly building short-range missile/tactical nuclear capabilities that can reach anywhere on the peninsula.
    
Pyongyang’s use of terms this year reaffirms such direction. The term “tactical weapons” is used for short-range missiles and artillery systems that presuppose regional use on the Korean peninsula, while the term “strategic weapons” is accurately used for systems that can hit Guam, the Pacific region, and the U.S. mainland. This classification, which divides nuclear capabilities into punishment deterrence against the U.S. mainland and denial deterrence on the Korean peninsula and the region, suggests the future direction of Pyongyang’s framework for nuclear arms control talks. 
 

II. Background: Diversification of Nuclear Capabilities

Pyongyang’s goal consistently set out in its plan to strengthen nuclear capabilities for regional targets can be summarized as an offset strategy aimed at asymmetrically compensating for a disadvantage in conventional military capabilities against the R.O.K.-U.S. alliance by threatening to launch a counter-force strike with tactical nuclear weapons even amid conventional warfare. Moreover, it is an attempt to strengthen deterrence by sending out its message that any war on the Korean peninsula could quickly escalate into tactical nuclear warfare. Since the third nuclear test in 2013, most of the North’s comments made until early 2018 on its nuclear capabilities or institutional measures were about strategic nuclear ICBM capabilities, assuming retaliation against the Pacific or U.S. mainland. However, during the North’s consideration process of tactical nuclear development from 2019, comments made at the enlarged meetings of the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the Central Committee of the WPK have focused on concerns over time urgency and the need for readiness to launch strikes to ensure responsiveness. In other words, it is Pyongyang’s way of thinking “tactical rockets” such as KN-23 and KN-24 carrying tactical nuclear warheads separately from its ICBM capabilities combined with high-yield nuclear warheads. This logic categorizes conventional military capabilities and tactical nuclear weapons in the same box, separating them from strategic nuclear weapons.
 

III. Analysis: Prospect for Detailed Framework for Nuclear Arms Control Talks

With its bid to strengthen nuclear war-fighting capabilities designed for regional use, Pyongyang will more likely seek to gain a partial advantage in return by selectively giving up nuclear capabilities rather than working toward complete denuclearization. This means that Pyongyang’s definition of nuclear arms control talks inferred from its recent official discourse can gradually reshape the framework for future nuclear negotiations aiming to discard or reduce selectively either “strategic weapons” or “tactical weapons.”
    
In September, the North brought up the issue of the so-called double standard while conducting a series of missile tests to justify its attempt to modernize short-range missiles and strengthen SLBM capabilities. Since then, Pyongyang has used the terms “military balance” and “military capabilities” on the Korean peninsula and adopted the logical framework that steered the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms control talks during the Cold War by quoting Chairman Kim’s remarks that the country’s main enemy is “war itself,” and not South Korea or the U.S.
    
The subsequent releases from the North criticized the AUKUS consultative body officially launched on September 15 and defined the South’s attempts to strengthen missile capabilities, including SLBM tests, as equivalent to the launching of the AUKUS, refuting those who condemn Pyongyang’s endeavor to strengthen its military capabilities for regional projection.  Chairman Kim’s speech at the Defense Development Exhibition on October 11 appears to have consummated such logic. He argued in his speech that North Korea decided to build up defense against escalating arms race in the region and the South’s strengthened conventional military forces, and accused those critical of the North’s decision of showing an unfair double standard or hypocrisy. This stands in contrast to Pyongyang’s previous calls to halt the maneuvers to build up military forces. Pyongyang is demanding that its rights to build up defense as a sovereign state should be recognized. North Korea’s state media said that Chairman Kim, in a policy speech delivered at the Supreme People’s Assembly, unveiled his goal of developing effective tactical plans to thoroughly implement the country’s strategies toward the U.S. by comprehensively analyzing the Biden administration’s North Korea policy, the outlook for U.S. domestic politics, and rapidly changing dynamics of international relations. From a broader perspective, Pyongyang’s move appears to be an attempt to gain international recognition as a de facto nuclear power and qualified negotiation party by equating the current situation with the Cold War. 
    
North Korea’s mention of “partial concessions” before and after the Hanoi Summit focused on suspending or delaying the completion and build-up of its nuclear capabilities at major nuclear facilities including the Yongbyon Nuclear Complex. However, as mentioned above, with its diversified portfolio of nuclear capabilities separating tactical weapons from strategic ones, Pyongyang can give variations to “partial concessions” and choose to discard only partial capabilities. For instance, after the U.S. and the Soviet Union signed the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which bans the possession of ballistic missiles with ranges less than 5,500km, the two countries made partial concessions on the nuclear deterrent doctrine based on mid-range missile capabilities and shifted their focus to the threat of retaliation, deterrence by punishment. North Korea’s new framework for nuclear talks seemingly aims to gain more in future nuclear talks. In 2018, the North demanded the lifting of international sanctions in exchange for giving up future nuclear capabilities or slowing the progress of its nuclear and missile development. In other words, North Korea at the time assumed that remaining with some degree of uncertainties in its retaliation capabilities towards  the U.S. mainland will likely be the result of early measures for denuclearization. However, it appears that Pyongyang aims to steer future negotiations by separately addressing the issue of deterrence against the U.S. and its tactical nuclear and missile capabilities for regional projection. In particular, it should be noted that Pyongyang’s recent diplomatic messages have focused on gaining international recognition for the legitimacy of its nuclear and missile capabilities for regional projection although it has been allocating a substantial amount of energy and resources to build up such capabilities since 2019. In this regard, Pyongyang will more likely seek to put long-range ICBM capabilities on the negotiation table first as there are remaining uncertainties regarding re-entry technology while setting aside the issue of the ongoing development of nuclear war-fighting forces for battlefield use in the region and tactical nuclear capabilities.

Of course, these changes are incongruent with the fundamental goal of denuclearizing North Korea and can erode the NPT regime by maintaining North Korea’s status as a nuclear-armed state at least for a considerable period. In particular, regional players, including the U.S., are unlikely to accept the framework as there could be conflicts of interest in the region. In contrast, Pyongyang can capitalize on regional players’ divergent interests to seize the upper hand in future nuclear talks or at least maximize their differences by driving a wedge between the U.S., South Korea, and Japan even if efforts at nuclear talks falter. This can become a considerable burden in creating a detailed roadmap for future nuclear talks. 

 
IV. Policy Recommendations

Throughout the various stages of negotiations after 2018, North Korea showed its commitment to advancing nuclear talks, tacitly concurring on the need for denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. However, Pyongyang’s recent moves seem to be focused on benefiting from the military utility of nuclear weapons to offset the asymmetry in its conventional forces as early as possible, which means that the scenario in which nuclear talks lead to complete denuclearization is rapidly losing its ground. These changing circumstances call for an overall policy review from a fresh perspective based on a comprehensive understanding of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities to minimize the risk of nuclear escalation on the Korean peninsula. 
    
To streamline this policy review process, it would be helpful to adopt the logic that North Korea’s completion of nuclear war-fighting capabilities, including its tactical nuclear weapons, will likely increase the chances of the use of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula significantly, ultimately affecting nuclear or strategic stability across Northeast Asia. It should be noted that Washington is likely to respond to the North’s tactical nuclear development with the additional deployment of SLBMs and SLCMs on the peninsula at all times to strengthen assurance of U.S. allies in the region, and this will likely stimulate Beijing’s concerns about regional nuclear imbalance between the two nuclear powers and demands for its own countermeasures. Therefore, Seoul needs to persuade Washington that resolving the issue of North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear capabilities designed for use on the Korean peninsula and regional projection first will likely be a gateway to advancing American national interests and its Indo-Pacific strategy more effectively.
    
North Korea’s advanced nuclear war-fighting capabilities and its evolving nuclear doctrine would also pose considerable risks to China and Russia. Therefore, it is recommended that Seoul make efforts to induce the two countries to warn Pyongyang of such dangers and prod the Kim regime to revise its nuclear doctrine. China has long denied the usefulness of the tactical nuclear doctrine or use of nuclear war-fighting capabilities, and adopted minimum deterrence without developing tactical nuclear weapons. This means that Beijing is most clearly aware of the instability and limitations of North Korea’s recent attempts to strengthen nuclear war-fighting capabilities for regional projection. Therefore, Seoul needs to communicate with Beijing and Moscow on the security risks posed by Pyongyang’s tactical nuclear development and evolving nuclear doctrine and explore ways to encourage them to discuss with the North that its efforts to advance tactical nuclear capabilities to leverage against Washington must be too risky for the sake of all regional stakeholders, and will not likely come by sensible military utility because of the U.S.’ overwhelming nuclear superiority. 


* Attached the File
  #NorthKorea #NuclearIssue #WarFighting #Capabilities #ArmsControlTalks #PendulumDiplomacy
다운로드
The Full Text.pdf
이전글
Assessment of the 2021 Japanese General Election and Outlook...
다음글
Security Effects of Emerging Military Technologies: Implicat...
이전
메뉴 담당자 정보 안내
메뉴담당자연구행정과 전화02-3497-7760